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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ______________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
Victor M. Roussos is a federal prison inmate serving a term 
for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 
846.  He appeals from an order of the district court denying his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Roussos 
completed a rigorous 500 hour Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) 
drug treatment program which he believed made him eligible for 
early release.  The BOP, however, ruled him ineligible because 
one of the arresting officers found a gun in his vacation home, 
and the sentencing court enhanced Roussos’ sentence by two levels 
as a result of this finding.  The enhancement, in turn, led the 
BOP, on the basis of a “Program Statement,” to classify Roussos’ 
offense as a crime of violence, thereby disqualifying him for 
early release.  Roussos’ appeal presents two related questions: 
(1) whether the enhancement renders the drug conspiracy 
conviction a violent offense; and (2) whether the Program 
Statement is therefore inconsistent with the congressional 
statute authorizing early release and with the BOP regulations 
interpreting the statute, so that Roussos must be granted relief. 
 Roussos so contends, arguing that the BOP action violates his 
rights.  We agree, and hence we shall vacate the district court's 




Roussos, a federal inmate formerly incarcerated in 
Allenwood, Pennsylvania, and presently in FCI-Seagoville, Texas, 
was convicted following his guilty plea to conspiracy to 
distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Roussos 
was arrested at his place of employment by the FBI after an anti-
drug task force zeroed in on a New York City area drug 
trafficking network in which Roussos had participated.  During a 
search of his automobile, FBI agents seized a brief case 
containing cocaine from the trunk.  A subsequent search of his 
upstate New York residence revealed several firearms, additional 
amounts of cocaine, and drug paraphernalia.  The sentencing 
court, acting pursuant to a plea bargain, treated the weapons to 
be connected with the drug offense and therefore imposed a two-
level Specific Offense Characteristic enhancement for possession 
of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense under U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1.  There is no dispute that 
guns were not a factor in his arrest and conviction.  Roussos was 
sentenced on December 16, 1993, to 87 months imprisonment with a 
four year period of supervised release. 
In his habeas petition, Roussos contends that the BOP has 
wrongfully denied him eligibility for a sentence reduction for 
his successful completion of a drug treatment program under 18 
U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994.  The Act provides in pertinent part: 
  (2) Incentive for prisoners' successful completion of 
 
 4 
treatment program. -- 
  
  *   *   *  
 
  (B) Period of custody. -- The period a prisoner 
convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody 
after successfully completing a treatment program may 
be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction 
may not be more than one year from the term the 
prisoner must otherwise serve.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (1994). 
The statute does not define “nonviolent offense.”  However, 
the relevant BOP regulations define its meaning by referencing 
the term “crime of violence” as it is used in the criminal code:  
[a]n inmate who completes a residential drug abuse 
treatment program during his or her current commitment 
may be eligible for early release by a period not to 
exceed 12 months, . . . unless the inmate's current 
offense is determined to be a crime of violence as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). . . . 
  
28 C.F.R. § 550.58 (1995) (as amended). 
 
In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (1984) defines the term  
 
"crime of violence" as: 
 
  an offense that is a felony and --  
 
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another, or  
 
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
that physical force against the person or property of 
another may be used in the course of committing the 
offense.  
 
18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(3). 
 
In an effort to further define the term “crime of violence” 
(and hence the term “nonviolent offense”), the BOP issued Program 
 
 5 
Statement 5162.02 (July 24, 1995) (amended April 26, 1996).  
Section 9 of the Program Statement provides that a conviction 
under § 841 or § 846 should be considered a crime of violence if 
the sentencing court increased the base level of the sentence for 
possession of a dangerous weapon during commission of the offense 
because “possession of a dangerous weapon during commission of a 
drug offense poses a substantial risk that force may be used 
against persons or property.”  Id.  
Roussos contends that he is eligible for a reduction because 
he was convicted of a “nonviolent offense” in that his offense 
has not been regarded as a crime of violence under § 924(c).  
See, e.g., United States v. Arrellano-Rios, 799 F.2d 520, 523 
(9th Cir. 1986) (possession of controlled substances with intent 
to sell, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), is a nonviolent offense; no 
narcotics offenses under § 841(a)(1) are "crimes of violence" 
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); United States v. Cruz, 
805 F.2d 1464, 1468-75 (11th Cir. 1986) (whether Congress 
intended statutory definition of "crime of violence" to include 
drug trafficking is ambiguous; such ambiguity precludes 
convicting defendants under statute permitting convictions for 
use of firearms during commission of “crime of violence”); United 
States v. Diaz, 778 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1985) (narcotics 
offenses are not crimes of violence within meaning of statute 





    
                     
1  See also United States v. Wells, 623 F. Supp. 645 (S.D. Iowa) 
(offense of cocaine distribution is not a "crime of violence" 
within firearm-enhancement statute), aff'd, 773 F.2d 230 (8th 
Cir. 1985); United States v. Bushey, 617 F. Supp. 292 (D.C. Vt. 
1985) (possession with intent to distribute narcotics, by itself 
or in conjunction with use or carrying of firearm, is not "crime 
of violence" for purposes of statute prohibiting use of firearm 
during or in relation to crime of violence). 
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Moreover, Roussos was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 
narcotics; if the actual distribution of narcotics does not 
constitute a crime of violence, it is hard to see how the 
conspiracy to do so can be so defined.  If eligible and granted 
release one year early, Roussos would have been released on or 
before June 25, 1997.
2
    
The BOP contends, however, that under the Program Statement, 
once a two-level firearms enhancement has been made by the 
sentencing court under the Sentencing Guidelines, a prisoner is 
deemed to have committed a “crime of violence” and thus is 
categorically ineligible for consideration of a reduction in 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).  The BOP submits that 
Roussos was declared ineligible for the reduction in the sentence 
because his sentence was enhanced by two levels for possession of 
a firearm.   
                     
2  It appears that Roussos’ statutory release date as of January, 
1997, was June 25, 1998, not counting any good time credits 
granted after January, 1997.  Thus, if given the full year 
sentence reduction, Roussos would have been released June 25, 
1997, at the latest, and possibly months earlier.  (See Supp. Br. 
of Appellant, at 29-30; App. at 362a.)  Because of this time 
frame, we have expedited the appeal. 
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The Magistrate Judge recommended granting habeas relief in a 
Report and Recommendation filed August 27, 1996.  However, the 
district court denied Roussos’ habeas petition on the basis that 
the BOP, as the agency charged with administering the statute, is 
free to adopt any reasonable interpretation of a statutory term 
(“nonviolent offense”) that Congress left undefined.  The 
district court found the BOP’s interpretation “entirely 
reasonable.”  The district court rejected the applicability of 
those cases that “focus on statutory definitions and elements of 
criminal offenses.”  The district court wrote: “The statutory 
construction cases have no application to the present case which 
involves a rehabilitative program for federal prisoners. . . . 
Roussos’ claim that a categorical approach must be followed in 
interpreting the phrase ‘nonviolent offense’ is without merit.”  





                     
3  The district court had federal question jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2241.  This court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  Because the question 
here is purely a legal one, review of the district court's order 
denying relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is de novo.  See Fowler v. 
United States Parole Comm'n, 94 F.3d 835, 837 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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The question presented is one of first impression for this 
Court.  However, we find guidance on this question in the opinion 
of our colleague Judge Aldisert in Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 
662, 669 (9th Cir. 1996).  Downey had entered a guilty plea to a 
federal drug indictment.  At sentencing, he received a two-level 
enhancement because firearms were found at the location of his 
arrest.  During his incarceration, he completed the BOP’s 
substance abuse program, but the BOP denied him eligibility for 
sentence reduction because of its categorical exclusion of 
inmates who, when sentenced, received a sentencing enhancement 
for possession of a firearm during commission of a drug 
trafficking offense.  Explaining that Downey had been convicted 
for possession of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), not of 
firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Judge Aldisert held that, in 
interpreting whether a prisoner was convicted of a “nonviolent 
offense” for purposes of granting a drug program reduction in 
sentence under § 3621(e)(2)(B), the BOP erred by considering 
sentencing factors (such as a firearms enhancement under the 
Guidelines) in lieu of the unambiguous statutory language which 
speaks only in terms of the conviction.  Id. at 668.  In other 
words, the statute makes clear that it is impermissible to 
consider facts other than those that form the basis for the 
elements of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted.
4
  
                     
4  See also Davis v. Crabtree, 109 F.3d 566, 568-69 (9th Cir. 
1997) (despite the BOP’s Program Statement listing felon firearm 
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The court stated: 
                                                                  
possession as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3), Ninth 
Circuit law has held to the contrary; the BOP cannot deny inmate 
eligibility for sentence reduction because inmate was not in 
category of nonviolent offenders; “parity of reasoning” requires 
that BOP interpretation of nonviolent offense must be consistent 
with Circuit law defining crime of violence); cf. Jacks v. 
Crabtree, 1997 WL 309962, *1-2 (9th Cir. June 11, 1997) (because 
§ 550.58 explicitly lists certain crimes, the conviction of which 
renders inmate ineligible for sentence reduction under § 3621, 
BOP may look beyond current offense of conviction in determining 
eligibility for sentence reduction for completion of drug 
program; the case is thereby distinguishable from Downey and 
Davis which addressed only a BOP Program Statement, not “a 
properly promulgated regulation to which we owe full Chevron 
deference”). 
The relevant statute speaks clearly and unambiguously. 
 The operative word of § 3621(e)(2)(B) is "convicted." 
 Downey was convicted of a drug-trafficking offense, 
which is not a crime of violence.  Section 
3621(e)(2)(B) addresses the act of convicting, not 
sentencing or sentence-enhancement factors.  The Bureau 
erred by conflating the guilt-determination 
(conviction) and sentencing processes.  The result is a 
Bureau interpretation that runs counter to the 
Sentencing Commission's formulation of a "non-violent 
offense" and judicial endorsement of that formulation. 
 
Id.   
The Downey court concluded that “inmates not convicted of 
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the firearm-possession offense, even if affected by 
sentence-enhancement factors for similar conduct, also cannot be 
denied sentence-reduction eligibility under a congressionally 
authorized program on grounds that their offense was not 
nonviolent.”  Id. at 667-68.  The Ninth Circuit therefore upheld 
a district court’s grant of habeas corpus.  Cf. Sesler v. Pitzer, 
110 F.3d 569, 571-72 (8th Cir. 1997) (conviction of offense of 
actually using a firearm during drug trafficking is not within 
class of nonviolent offenses for purposes of eligibility for 
sentence reduction under § 3621(e)(2)(B); BOP Program Statement 
which defines as violent all convictions for using a firearm 
during drug trafficking is not arbitrary). 
That conclusion is similar to that reached by the Supreme Court in 
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (190). In Taylor, the Court examined 
the Carer Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, which enhances the sentence 
imposed on a convicted defendant who had previously ben convicted of certain 
crimes. The Court held that, to determine whether prior convictions satisfy 
the Act, a sentencing court may examine only the facts proving the particular 
elements of the prior convictions, not the facts of the defendant
’
s conduct 
that surounded the conviction. Se id. at 59-602. The Court noted that the 












certain crimes. Se id. at 60. The Court reasoned that such language 
focused the inquiry on the conviction itself, not on the conduct giving rise 
to the conviction.
 
Roussos, like Downey, has been denied eligibility for 
sentence reduction under § 3621(e)(2)(B) not because his offense 
has been classified as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3), 
but based solely upon the Program Statement that categorically 
declares all inmates with two-level sentencing enhancements for 
firearm possession ineligible.  By ignoring the offense of 
conviction and looking only to sentencing factors, the BOP has 
attempted to transmogrify a “nonviolent offense” into “a crime of 
violence.”  In other words, the BOP converted a nonviolent crime 
into a violent one by means of a Program Statement that is 
inconsistent with the language of the statute, and its own 
regulations.  More specifically, under the rationale of Downey, 
we find the BOP’s interpretation of a nonviolent offense in the 
Program Statement to be in conflict with both 18 U.S.C. § 
3621(e)(2)(B) and 28 C.F.R. § 550.58 and therefore erroneous. 
The BOP may contend that classifying drug trafficking as a 
crime of violence is permissible in light of the fact that this 
Court has never clearly held otherwise.  Although this Court has 
not specifically held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846 is not 
“a crime of violence,” we do not find this dispositive for 
purposes of interpreting the applicable statute and regulation.  
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Section 3621(e)(2)(B) refers to a conviction of a nonviolent 
offense, which is cross-referenced in § 550.58 to import the 
definition of a crime of violence provided in § 924(c)(3), a 
statute with a large body of interpretative case law.  And, as 
noted, several courts have determined that conspiracy to possess 
or distribute drugs, by itself, cannot be properly classified as 
a crime of violence.  See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 
1464, 1468 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987). 
More importantly, the BOP has not argued that Roussos was 
denied eligibility for a sentence reduction because his 
conviction was classified as a crime of violence under § 924(c). 
 Rather, the BOP declared Roussos ineligible solely because of 
his sentence enhancement.  Had Roussos’ sentence not been 
enhanced, he apparently would have remained eligible for a 
sentence reduction under § 3621(e)(2)(B) because his conviction 
was not classified as a crime of violence under § 924(c).  Thus, 
the fact that this Court has not spoken on whether a violation of 
§ 846 is a crime of violence has little bearing upon Roussos’ 
eligibility for a sentence reduction; under the statute and the 
accompanying regulation, Roussos is eligible in the absence of 
his conviction for a nonviolent offense or a crime of violence, 
neither of which occurred.
5
 
                     
5  Other pending cases address the question whether the felon-in-
possession crime, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), constitutes a crime of 
violence.  We surely do not decide that question here.  However, 
we do note that resolution of that question will be informed by 
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experience with the career offender provisions of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  See Impounded, No. 96-7781, slip. op. at 18 n.13 (3d 
Cir. June 30, 1997) (discussing case law interpreting the career 
offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines and their 
relationship to the felon-in-possession crime).  We also note 
that because of conflicting circuit precedent over whether the 
felon-in-possession crime was a crime of violence for purposes of 
the Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission amended the 
Application Notes to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 specifically to exclude the 
felon-in-possession crime from the definition of crime of 
violence for purposes of the career offender guidelines.  See 
1992 U.S.S.G., App. C, Amend. 461. 
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The district court rejected out-of-hand the so-called 
“statutory construction cases,” despite the fact that the precise 
issue at hand is the proper construction of the statute.  The 
district court also appears to have erroneously given the BOP 
undue deference in its statutory construction.  The BOP 
interpretation is rooted only in a Program Statement to which 
“some deference” is due.  See Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 558, 562 
(3d Cir. 1994), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Reno v. Koray, 
515 U.S. 50 (1995) (bureau program statements are entitled to 
less deference because they are not promulgated under the 
Administrative Procedure Act and are “merely internal guidelines 
[that] may be altered by the Bureau at will”); National R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Boston and Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 
(1992) (where bureau's "interpretation is . . . in conflict with 
the plain language of the statute, deference is [not] due").  
Although the Program Statement the BOP used to deny Roussos 
eligibility for a sentence reduction is entitled to “some 
deference” under Koray, it must be rejected where it is 
inconsistent with the clear language of the statute.  Fowler v. 
United States Parole Comm'n, 94 F.3d 835, 837 (3d Cir. 1996) (“We 
owe no deference  . . . to administrative interpretations or 





     Having concluded that the BOP’s interpretation is in 
conflict with the statute and its own regulations, we find that 
the BOP cannot rely upon Roussos’ sentencing enhancement to deny 
him eligibility for the sentence reduction.  Accordingly, we will 
vacate the district court order.
6
  Roussos contends that he has 
met the requirements under 28 C.F.R. § 550.58(a)(2) for early 
release and requests that we order his immediate placement in the 
appropriate Community Corrections Center.
7
  We decline that 
invitation.  Instead, we will remand the matter to the district 
court with directions that it immediately remand the case to the 
BOP for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
8
  The 
mandate shall issue forthwith. 
                         
 
 
                     
6  In fairness to Judge McClure, the able district judge whose 
order we vacate, we note that he has reconsidered this issue in a 
subsequent decision, Mallozzi v. Menifee, No. 96-1721, slip op., 
(M.D. Pa. December 27, 1996), in which he concedes that “on 
further consideration [] Roussos was decided incorrectly.”  
(Order dated Feb. 27, 1997, at 2.) 
7  Roussos has executed his agreement to participate in Community 
Transition Programming, as required by 28 C.F.R. § 
550.58(a)(1)(ii).  See Index to Exhibits of Habeas Corpus 
Petition. 
8  The BOP will determine whether there is any other basis for 
denying Roussos early release under § 3621(e)(2)(B).  Otherwise, 
as its counsel represented at oral argument, it should be granted 
and Roussos placed in a Community Corrections Center.  
 
